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THE LAW OF WIRE TAPPING*
MARGARET LYBOLT ROSENZWEIG
Introduction
The earliest references in the law to wire tapping are found in the penal
provisions enacted by the state legislatures during the last half of the nine-
teenth century when the growing use of the telegraph gave rise to a new
body of law for the protection of this mode of communication.1 These pro-
visions were usually in-the form of a malicious injury statute forbidding the
act of wire tapping among other interferences with the telegraph system or
specified kinds of property damage to the telegraph company. Prosecutions
under these provisions seem to have been rare. The law lay dormant, there-
fore, until the lawless twenties when the rise of organized crime, the difficulty
of enforcing the Prohibition Law, and the perfecting of wire tapping devices
brought about widespread use of wire tapping in crime detection by law
enforcement officers.
The use of wire tapped evidence in criminal prosecution raised the serious
question whether such evidence was admissible even though it had been
obtained in violation of statute or through invasion of constitutional rights.
If the evidence aided in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused, should the court ignore the manner in which it had been secured,
or should the court reject it regardless of the end to be achieved, because
of the reprehensible means used to obtain it? This is the basic question which
has engaged the attention of the courts, of the legislatures, and of every writer
in the field during the last quarter of a century.
This problem is an offshoot of an older controversy which has been waged
with bitterness in American courts since the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States in 1914.2 This controversy con-
cerns admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the right guaranteed
by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and by the
constitutions of all the states3 against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Although wire tapping is not technically a "search" or a "seizure" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 4 the law relating to evidence pro-
*This is the first instalment of a study which was prepared for the New York State
Bar -Association. The second instalment will appear in the September 1947 issue of
the QUARTERLY.'1The statutes and decisions interpreting them are discussed in Part IV of this study.
2232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341 (1914).3See note 50 infra.
401mstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 48 Sup. Ct. 564 (1928).
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cured by wire tapping is in many respects analogous to that relating to search
and seizure. An understanding of the principal cases involving wire tapping
is impossible without a knowledge of the development and arguments relating
to the older and more general controversy to which the law of wire tapping
is heir. This study, therefore, after a reference to early English and Ameri-
can cases dealing with the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence, will
proceed to a consideration of the Weeks case and succeeding cases in the
United States Supreme Court which established the so-called federal rule
as to the admissibility of evidence secured by unreasonable search and seizure.
It will then show the position of the other jurisdictions on this question as
some indication of their policy on admitting wire tapped evidence, since few
state courts have ruled directly on admissibility of the latter. With this
foundation, an examination will be made of the following points: the admis-
sibility of wire tapped evidence in federal courts under the provisions of the
Fourth Amendment and federal statutes; the penal provisions of the various
states prohibiting wire tapping and the cases on admissibility of wire tapped
evidence in those few jurisdictions where this has been determined; the
law of New York State with particular reference to the significance of the
1938 amendment to the constitution and the wire tapping statute implement-
ing this amendment; and lastly, an analysis of the considerations usually
offered for and against admission of wire tapped evidence.
PART I
The State of the Law Generally as to the Adnissibility of Illegally
Obtained Evidence Prior to the Weeks Case.
The general rule that the illegal manner in which evidence was obtained
is not a valid objection to its admissibility has its roots far back in the
common law.5 In the trial of Bishop Atterbury for treason in 1723, the
question arose whether the interception of certain letters which the Crown
offered in evidence had been made under warrant as required by statute.
It was decided that the question how the letters were obtained would not
be considered, that it was "inconsistent with the public safety, as well as
unnecessary for the prisoner's defence, to suffer any further enquiry to be
made". 6 This principle was carried over into civil cases for the first time
in Jordan v. Lewis,7 an action for malicious prosecution, in which the plaintiff
This rule has been called one of the oldest of the common law. Note (1911) 136
Am. St. Rep. 135, 137.6Bishop Atterbury's Trial, 16 How. St. Tr. 323, 495 (1723).
714 East 306, 104 Eng. Rep. 618 n. (1740).
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obtained a copy of the indictment against him without authority of the judge
in the criminal action. It was held that the copy was admissible regardless
of the illegality of the manner in which it was obtained. Legatt v. Tollervey8
and Caddy v. Bar-low9 were also actions of malicious prosecution involving
similar questions as to the admissibility of copies of indictments which were
illegally obtained. Both courts followed the ruling in Jordan v. Lewis without
question. Stockfleth v. De Tastet0 was an action of assumpsit in which the
court received evidence over defendant's objection of his examination in, a
bankruptcy suit contrived by plaintiff's solicitor, who was also solicitor to
the commissioner in bankruptcy, for the sole purpose of securing evidence
for this action. Lord Ellenborough stated that he could not consider whether
the defendant was properly or improperly summoned before the commis-
sioners in bankruptcy. In Rex v. Derrington" the defendant, indicted for
burglary, objected to the admissibility of a letter written by him while in
prison which the turnkey had promised to post and instead had turned over
to the authorities. The objection was overruled.
Later English courts adhered consistently to the doctrine of admissibility,12
but it is the handful of decisions cited in the preceding paragraph which
form the cornerstone of the doctrine. They were in existence when the ques-
tion was first considered by an American court, and two of them, Legatt v.
Tollervey and Jordan v. Lewis, were cited by it as sound authority for the
814 East 302, 104 Eng. Rep. 617 (1811).
91 Man. & Ry. 275 (1827).
104 Camp. 10, 171 Eng. Rep. 4 (1814).
112 Car. & P. 418, 172 Eng. Rep. 189 (1826).
l2 Queen v. Granatelli, VII Rep. St. Tr. (N.s.) 979 (1849) (prosecution illegally ob-
tained knowledge of contents of incriminating document) ; Phelps v. Prew, 3 E. & B.
430, 118 Eng. Rep. 1203 (1854) (evidence obtained by breach of privilege between
attorney and client) ; Calcraft v. Guest, [18981 1 Q.B. 759 (breach of privilege between
attorney and client) ; Lloyd v. Mostyn, 10 M. & W. 478, 152 Eng. Rep. 558 (1842)
(same). See 86 JusT. P. 1-73 (1922) to the effect that evidence is admissible in English
courts despite the illegal manner in which it may have been secured. Elias v. Pasmore,
[19341 2 K.B. 164 (1933), an action of trespass against police officers for unlawful
seizure of papers, allowed no recovery where the papers seized had been admitted in
evidence in a criminal prosecution against Elias, ". . . the interests of the State must
excuse the seizure of documents, which seizure would otherwise be unlawful, if it ap-
pears in fact that such documents were evidence of a crime committed by anyone, and
that so far as the documents in this case fall into this caegory, the seizure of them is
excused. . . . the seizure of these exhibits was justified, because they were capable of
being and were used as evidence in this trial. If I am right in the above view, the
original seizure of these exhibits, though improper at the time, would therefore be
excused," Id. at 173. Thus, according to this reasoning, the evidence, far from being tainted
by its illegal source, purifies the seizure.
Canadian law is in accord with English law in holding illegally obtained evidence
admissible. Regina v. Doyle, 12 Ont. 347 (Q. B. D. 1886); King v. Hawkins, 35
Queb. K. B. 96 (1923).
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rule which it declared to be the law. The court was the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts. In Comnmonwealth v. Dava,'3 decided in 1841 on an appeal
from a conviction for the illegal possession of lottery tickets, the court held
that the seizure of the lottery tickets had been lawful. By way of dictum,
however, the opinion stated that even if illegally seized, the tickets would
still be admissible; the court, in the single paragraph devoted to this point,
foreshadowed the arguments later developed to a greater extent by the ex-
ponents of the rule of admissibility. "If the search warrant were illegal, or
if the officer serving the warrant exceeded his authority, the party on whose
complaint the warrant issued, or the officer, would be responsible for the
wrong done; but this is no good reason for excluding the papers seized as
evidence, if they were pertinent to the issue, as they unquestionably were.
When papers are offered in evidence, the court can take no notice how they
were obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully; nor would they form a col-
lateral issue to determine that question."1 4
The rule as stated in the Dana case was adopted with few exceptions by
all courts which had occasion to rule on this issue in the next few decades.' 5
It was held that evidence relevant to the issue was admissible regardless of
how it had been obtained, 16 whether the illegal act was committed by a pri-
vate individual' 7 or a public officer,' 8 and whether the proceeding was a civil
suit for damages' 9 or a criminal prosecution.20 The reason usually assigned
for ignoring the method by which the evidence was obtained was that the,
132 Metc. 329 (Mass. 1841).
14d. at 337.
151 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE (15th ed. 1892) § 254a. The first square holding was State
v. Flynn, 36 N. H. 64 (1858) ; Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law (1939) 24
CORNELL L. Q. 337, 354.
The earlier cases are collected in 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2183, n. 1;
Note (1923) 24 A. L. R. 1408, 1411. Among the few decisions rejecting evidence be-
cause illegally obtained were United States v. Mounday, 208 Fed. 186 (D. C. Kan. 1913) ;
State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164, 96 N. W. 730 (1903) ; State v. Slamon, 73 Vt. 212,
50 AUt. 1097 (1901). A line of decisions in the Georgia Court of Appeals excluded
evidence disclosed by illegal search of the person, Underwood v. State, 13 Ga. App.
206, 78 S. E. 1103 (1913). See Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 621, 6 Sup. Ct.
524, 527 (1886).
16"Seemingly no one has considered the contention that evidence legally obtained,
but obtained in contravention of some moral or ethical principle, is inadmissible, of suf-
ficient merit to warrant an allegation of error or a decision in a court whose reports
come down to us." 5 JONES, COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENCE (Rev. 2d ed. 1926) § 2075.
17Imboden v. People, 40 Colo. 142, 90 Pac. 608 (1907) ; Commonwealth v. Everson,
123 Ky. 330, 96 S. W. 460 (1906) ; State v. Mathers, 64 Vt. 101, 23 Atl. 590 (1891).
'SPeople v. Cotta, 49 Cal. 166 (1874); State v. Burroughs, 72 Me. 479 (1881);
State v. Flynn, 36 N. H. 64 (1858).
19Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 Fed. 353 (E. D. Pa. 1912)
Sullivan v. Nicoulin, 113 Iowa 76, 84 N. W. 978 (1901).
20See note 18 supra.
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court would not halt the progress of the trial to determine a "collateral"
issue, having no bearing on the outcome of the litigation at hand.2-
PART II
The Trend of Decisions as to Admissibility of Illegally Seized Evidence
Subsequent to the Weeks Case.
A. In Federal Courts.
The inclination of the United States Supreme Court to deviate from the
well established rule of admissibility was fifst mafiifested in Boyd v. United
States. 22 'his was an appeal from a judgment of forfeiture in favor of the
United States on an information filed to confiscate certain property alleged
to have been illegally imported. On the trial it became important to show
the quantity and value of property of a similar nature, previously imported.
The United States, under authority of a statute governing this procedure,
applied for an order requiring the defendants to produce the invoice of this
property. The defendants in obedience to the order produced the invoice, but
objected to its admissibility on the ground that the use of this evidence vio-
lated their constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
of the Federal Constitutiop. The Fourth Amendment provides, "The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." The Fifth Amend-
ment declares that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against "himself". The statute under which the Government moved
for production of the invoice provided that on failure to produce the papers
required, the allegations stated in the motion would be taken as confessed.
The Court held that the statute and the order issued thereunder were a vio-
lation of the Fifth Amendment inasmuch as the production of papers com-
pelled defendants to bear witness against themselves, and suits for penalties
and forfeitures were of a quasi-criminal nature and therefore within the con-
stitutional guaranty. This would have been sufficient to decide the case, but
the Court went much farther in declaring that there had also been an in-
fringement of defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment, since a com-
pulsory production of papers was tantamount to a search and seizure. More-
over, an extended review of the history of the Fourth Amendment led the
Court to decide that thi compulsory production of the invoice was an un-
reasonable search and seizure within the condemnation of the Amendment.
21Note (1911) 136 Am. St. Rep. 135, 142.
22116 U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524 (1886).
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"We have already noticed the intimate relation between the two Amendments.
They throw great light on each other. For the 'unreasonable searches and
seizures' condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for
the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in
criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man
'in a criminal case to be a witness against himself,' which is condemned in
the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an 'un-
reasonable search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private
books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially different
from compelling him to be a witness against himself".2 Two judges, con-
curring in the result, were of the opinion that the order violated only the
guaranty under the Fifth Amendment, and that no search and seizure were
involved.
The dictum in the Boyd case that admission of evidence obtained by un-
lawful search and seizure would be equivalent to compelling a man to be a
witness against himself, was thus a pronouncement that contrary to the ac-
cepted belief, illegally seized evidence should not be received on the trial. In
other words, the merging of the Fifth Amendment with the Fourth, added
to the Fourth a definite rule, heretofore lacking, concerning the evidentiary
result in case its terms should be violated. This conclusion was reached with-
out any discussion of the common law doctrine as to admissibility of illegally
obtained evidence.
2 4
The confusion caused by the assimilation of the two Amendments in the
Boyd case was clarified to some extent by the decision of the Supreme Court
in Adants v. New York.2 The defendant there was convicted of possession
of certain gambling paraphernalia. At the time of his arrest, the police
searched his premises and seized not only policy slips but many of his private
papers as well. The latter were introduced in evidence for the purpose of
identifying handwriting of the defendant upon the slips and to show that
the office where the slips were found was occupied by him. The defendant
231d. at 633, 6 Sup. Ct. at 534.24The Boyd case dictum actually extended to documents obtained by even a lawful
search making such documents inadmissible as a form of testimonial compulsion, for-
bidden by the, Fifth Amendment. Professor Wigmore, severely criticizing the reasoning
in the Boyd case, points out that this fallacy was soon corrected, for in Adams v. New
York, 192 U. S. 585, 24 Sup. Ct. 372 (1904), the Supreme Court held that the accused
was not compelled to incriminate himself by-the reception in evidence of documents
seized from him (whether legally or illegally the Court does not decide). 8 WIGMOE,
EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §§ 2184, 2264.
25192 U. S. 585, 24 Sup. Ct. 372 (1904).
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objected to the admission of these private papers, resting his objections in
part on the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Federal Constitution. The
Supreme Court, upholding the Court of Appeals of New York,26 decided
that it was unnecessary to consider whether the papers were lawfully or
unlawfully seized, for "the weight of authority as well as reason limits the
inquiry to the competency of the proffered testimony".2 7 It further held,
in a clear separation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, that the accused
was not compelled to incriminate himself by admission of the seized papers,
inasmuch as he did not take the witness stand and was not compelled to
testify concerning the papers or make any admission concerning them. It
thus reverted to the orthodox view of the Fifth Amendment, that the privi-
lege therein guaranteed is against disclosure through legal prodess as a wit-
ness.2 8 The opinion carefully distinguishes the Boyd case on the ground
that the statute there held unconstitutional virtually compelled the defendant
to furnish testimony against himself, but the Adams case undoubtedly had
the effect of repudiating the dictum in Boyd v. United States that an un-
lawful search and seizure was tantamount to compulsory self-incrimination
and therefore the evidence they yielded was inadmissible.
The Adams case stood unchallenged for a decade, when Weeks v. United
States29 entrenched the position of the Court firmly in opposition to admis-
sion of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The disputed
evidence in that case consisted of papers taken by the United States marshal
from the defendant's house without a warrant some time after the defendant's
arrest. The defendant's petition 'before trial for return of the papers was
denied. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground that ad-
mission of such evidence, when timely application had been made for its
return, would constitute an invasion of defendant's rights under the Fourth
Amendment. The Court declared that if such evidence were held admissible,
the Fourth Amendment would be of nq value and "might as well be stricken
from the Constitution".30 The Court held that two features distinguished
the Adans case from the one before it: (1) The papers to which objection
was raised in the Adams case "were incidentally seized in the lawful exe-
cution of a warrant and not' in the wrongful invasion of the home of the
citizen". 3 ' (2) Since no motion was made before trial in the Adams case,
26People v. Adams, 176 N. Y. 351, 68 N. E. 636 (1903).
27192 U. S. 585, 594, 24 Sup. Ct. 372, 374 (1904).
288 WIGmpO, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §§ 2263, 2264.
29232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341 (1914).301d. at 393, 34 Sup. Ct. at 344.
31Id. at 395, 34 Sup. Ct. at 345.
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the Court was bound by the rule that a collateral issue may not be raised to
determine the source of competent testimony. On the first point, it may be
noticed that the Court in the Adams case ruled unequivocally that in accord-
ance with the common law doctrine stated in Comnonwealth v. Dana, Legatt
v. Tollervey, and Jordan v. Lewis, 32 it would not examine the source of the
evidence and accordingly it avoided stating anywhere in the opinion whether
the seizure of defendant's papers was lawful or unlawful. As to the second
attempted basis of distinction, the requirement of a motion before trial does
not render the determination concerning the source of evidence less "col-
lateral", which means "relevant to the issue". There seems to be no sound
reason for requiring this particular collateral issue to be decided before trial,
when objections to admissibility of evidence on other grounds-for instance,
the credibility of a confession and the competency of witnesses, are considered
as a matter of course at the trial.33
Whatever the unsoundness of its legal theory, the principle of the Weeks
case has frequently been reiterated and expanded by the Supreme Court. In
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,3 4 it was held that information
gained through illegally seized documents which had been returned to the
owner could not be used at the trial. In Gouled v. United States,35 the re-
moval of papers from the office of the defendant surreptitiously by a federal
agent was declared to be an unreasonable search and seizure, and the ad-
mission of such papers in evidence, a violation of the Fifth Amendment
upon authority of the Boyd case. Agnello v. United States"6 held that the
rule excluding from evidence illegally seized articles or property extended
to contraband such as cocaine. Nor could such evidence be introduced against
the defendant in rebuttal of his testimony on cross-examination that he never
saw the article.
The method employed in the Weeks case to circumvent the decision in
Adams v. New York by requiring a motion before trial has led to a rule
of practice in federal courts still followed wl~en the defendant in criminal
proceedings desires the suppression of illegally seized evidence. In case of
failure to test admissibility on this score by a preliminary motion, the ob-
jection will not be entertained upon the trial. 37 This rule is subject to two
3 2See notes 7, 8, 13 supra.
WThese criticisms are voiced by 8 WIGmoRE, EViDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2184; Plumb,
Illegal Enforcement of the Law (1939) 24 CORNELL L. Q. 337, 355, 356.
34251 U. S. 385, 40 Sup. Ct. 182 (1920).
35255 U. S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261 (1921).
36269 U. S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. 4 (1925).
37See Segurola v. United States, 275 U. S. 106, 112, 48 Sup. Ct. 77, 79 (1927); (1938)
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exceptions permitting the issue first to be raised on trial (1) when the
defendant has not previously been informed that evidence has been seized
and is to be used against him,38 (2) when the illegal seizure is not disputed
but is admitted at the time the evidence is offered at the trial.39 Despite its
accidental origin, this procedural requirement may be rationalized by expla-
nation that a preliminary motion affords the prosecution an opportunity to
prepare to defend itself against this attack without delaying the trial. This
is unnecessary, however, where it would have been impossible for the de-
fendant, through lack of knowledge, to raise the objection before trial, or
where the prosecution admits the facts and therefore requires no time for
preparation to refute them.
Some of the Supreme Court cases apply the doctrine of the Weeks case
to hold that papers or articles should be suppressed if seized solely for
the purpose of securing evidence of a crime. Such seizures are unreasonable,
even if made under a search warrant accurately describing the property, and
the articles and information gained thereby are inadmissible.40 'The distinc-
tion between the use of search warrants for the purpose of securing evidence
and for the purpose of seizing instrumentalities of the crime is stated by the
Court as follows: "They (search warrants) may not be used as a means of
gaining access to a man's house or office and papers solely for the purpose
of making search to secure evidence to be used against him in a criminal
or penal proceeding, but . . . they may be resorted to only when a primary
right to such search and seizure may be found in the interest which the
public or the complainant may have in the property to be seized, or in the
right to the possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power
renders possession of the property by the accused unlawful and provides that
it may be taken".41
Another limitation on the federal rule excluding illegally seized evidence
which deserves notice here- is that such evidence will be admitted if the il-
legal act has been committed by one not an agent of the Federal Government.
The Fourth Amendment is not applicable to such cases inasmuch as it refers
8 BRooLYN L. REv. 239; (1933) 1 U. oF Cmi. L. REv. 120; Thormodsgard, The Ag-
nello Case and the Seasonable Demand Ride (1927) 1 DAK. L. REv. 1. The more recent
federal cases are collected in Notes (1944) 150 A. L. R. 573, (1941) 134 A. L. R. 826.38Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261 (1921).3 9Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. 4 (1925); Amos v. United
States, 255 U. S.'313, 41 Sup. Ct. 266 (1921).
4OGouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261 (1921) ; Go-Bart Importing
Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 51 Sup. Ct. 153 (1931) ; United States v. Lefkowitz,
285 U. S. 452, 52 Sup. Ct. 420 (1932).4 1 Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 309, 41 Sup. Ct. 261, 265 (1921).
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only to governmental action. Burdeau v. McDowel142 was an independent
proceeding to enjoin a public officer from using in criminal proceedings
certain papers taken without permission from petitioner's office by a private
individual without knowledge of the government and turned over several
months later to the Department of Justice. It was held that the papers might
be retained by the United States for use in evidence against the petitioner.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, in a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice Holmes
concurred, declared that the evidence should be rejected even though no
constitutional provision had been violated. The case is significant in defining
the position of the Court towards illegally obtained evidence. It demonstrates
that the Court still adhered to the ancient rule admitting such evidence and
that the principle of exclusion established by the Weeks case was merely an
exception to that rule, an exception confined solely to the exclusion of evi-
dence obtained in violation of a constitutional right.
43
Under the rule of the Burdeau case, evidence illegally seized by a state
or local officer acting solely on behalf of his own government is admissible
in criminal proceedings in a federal court, where he is regarded as a private
individual; but if he acts as agent for the United States in enforcing a fed-
eral law, evidence secured by him in cqntravention of the Fourth Amendment
will be rejected.44 On the other hand, the presence of a federal officer at an
illegal search by state officers is not sufficient cause for exclusion of the
evidence thereby obtained, but his participation in such a search for the pur-
pose of obtaining evidence of a federal offense will cause the court to exclude
it under the principle of the Weeks case. 45 These distinctions are admittedly
difficult to apply. They are of practical importance, however, in wire tapping
cases in which the frequent cooperation of federal and state police is likely to
raise similar problems. 46
B. In State Courts.
The Weeks case and succeeding cases which spelled out the so-called
42256 U. S. 465, 41 Sup. Ct. 574 (1921).
43This distinction is clearly set forth in 5 JONES, COaXmENTArIES ON EVIDENCE (Rev.
2d ed. 1926) § 2076; Note (1938) 10 RocxY MT. L. REV. 284.44Gambino v. United States, 275 U. S. 310, 48 Sup. Ct. 137 (1927).4 5Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28, 47 Sup. Ct. 248 (1927). In Anderson v.
United States, 318 U. S. 350, 63 Sup. Ct. 599 (1943), the Supreme Court excluded
evidence of confessions obtained illegally by local officers with the cooperation of federal
officers.
46For the extent of cooperation generally, see speech by District Attorney Thomas
E. Dewey read at the New York State Constitutional Convention in 1938. 1 N. Y. St.
Const. Cony., Rev. Record, p. 372. In Re Milburne, 77 F. (2d) 310 (C. C. A. 2d,
1935) the prosecutions under federal law originated in wire-tapped information secured
by local police.
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federal rule and its qualifications were in no way binding on the courts of
the various states. The Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Federal Con-
stitution were adopted at the demand of the states to protect their citizens
against action of the Federal Government,47 and hence it is well established
that these amendments are limitations on the powers of the Federal Govern-
ment only.48 The "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
is applicable to the states, has been held not to include the guaranties against
unreasonable search and seizure and compulsory self-incrimination contained
in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 49 The state courts were therefore free
to admit or exclude illegally seized evidence in accordance with their inter-
pretations of their own constitutional provisions. All states except New
York had provisions which correspond to the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution,5 0 and none contained an express provision con-
cerning the admission of evidence secured in contravention thereof.51
While the Weeks case exerted no coripulsion on the state courts its in-,
fluence was profoundly felt. As noted before, at one time the almost unani-
4 7GREENIIAN, WIRE TAPPING, Irs RELATION TO CIVIL LIBERTIES (1938) 8-12.
4STwining v, New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14 (1908); Spies v. Illinois,
123 U. S. 131, 8 Sup. Ct. 21 (1887).49Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 58 Sup. Ct. 149 (1937); Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14 (1908) ; People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E.
585 (1926), cert. denied, 270 U. S. 657, 46 Sup. Ct. 353 (1925).
50ALA. CONST. Art. I, § 5; Aiz. CONST. Art., 2, § 8; ARK. CoNsT. Art. II, § 15;
CAL. CONST. Art. I, § 19; COLO. CONST. Art. II, § 7; CONN. CONST. Art. I, § 8; DEL,
CONST. Art. I, § 6; FLA. CONST., DEcL. RIGHTS, § 22; GA. CoNST. Art. I, § 1, ff XVI;
IDAHO CONST. Art. I, § 17; ILL. CONST. Art. II, j 6; IND. CONsT. Art. I, § 11; IowA
CONST. Art. I, § 8; KAN. CoNsT., BILL RIGHTS, § 15; Ky. CONST., BILL RIGHTS, § 10;
LA. CONST. Art. I, § 7; ML CONsT. Art. I, § 5; MD. CON sT., DEcL. RIGHTS, Art. 26;
MASS. CONST. Pt. I, Art. XIV; MIc H. CONsT. Art. II, § 10; MINN. CONST. Art. I,
§ 10; MISS. CONST. § 23; Mo. CQNST. Art. II, § 11; MONT. CONsT. Art. III, § 7; NEB.
CONST. Art. I, § 7; NEv. CONST. Art. I, § 18; N. H. CONST. Pt. I, Art. 19; N. J. CONST.
Art. I, Uf 6; N. M. CONST. Art. 2, § 10; N. C. CONS?. Art. I, § 15; N. D. CONST. § 18;
OHIO CONST. Art. I, § 14; OKLA. CONST. Art. II, § 30; ORE. CONST. Art. I, § 9;
PA. CONST. Art. I, § 8; R. I. CONsT. Art. I, § 6; S. C. CoNsT. Art. I, § 16; S. D.
CoNST. Art. VI, § 11; TENN. CONsT. Art. I, § 7; Tzx. CoNsT. Art. I, § 9; UTAH
CONS. Art. I, § 14; VT. CONST. Ch. I, Art. 11; VA. CONST. Art. I, § 10; WASH.
CoNs?. Art. I, § 7; W. VA. CoNsT. Art. III, § 6; Wis. CoxsT.,Art. I, § 11; Wyo.
CONST. Art. 1, § 4.
A provision forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures was not inserted in the
New York State Constitution until 1938. See Part V of this Study.5 The Constitution of the State of. Michigan now includes a provision that the search
and seizure section shall not be construed to bar from evidence in any criminal pro-
ceeding certain specified kinds of dangerous weapons seized bjr a peace officer outside
a dwelling house. MICH. CONST. Art. II, § 10. This provision was not adopted until
1936, however.
A proposal to make evidence obtained by unlawful search inadmissible failed to pass
the 1921 Constitutional Convention of Louisiana. See Journal of Constitutional Con-
vention of Louisiana, 423, 454, 471, 1011. And see State v. Fleckinger, 152 La. 338,
93 So. 115 (1922).
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mous position of the American courts was that evidence illegally obtained,
whether in violation of a statute or a constitutional provision, was neverthe-
less admissible.52 The dictum in the BoydE case attracted scarcely any fol-
lowing,153 but after the Weeks decision and with the enactment of the Na-
tional Prohibition Act, the situation was ripe for a change. The indiscriminate
raids of the prohibition agents and the fact that many defendants were erst-
while law-abiding citizens rather than hardened criminals led court after
court to adopt the rule of the Weeks, case. 4 The theoretical justification for
the change was that the requirement of a preliminary motion obviated the
old objection that the consideration of the source of evidence was a "col-
lateral issue" and that determination of this issue would unduly delay the
trial.r Surveys from time to time indicated a growing tide in favor of the
rule excluding the evidence. In 1923, nine courts of last resort in the states
had adopted the federal rule completely or in modified form ;56 in 1928, this
number had increased to fifteen,5 7 and in 1934, to eighteen,58 which is the
count at present. The states now in this group are Florida,59 Idaho,60
Illinois,6' Indiana,62 Kentucky, 63 Michigan,6 4 Mississippi, 65 Missouri,6 6 Mon-
tana,67 Oklahoma,6 8 Oregon, 69 South Dakota,70 Tennessee, 71 Texas, 72 Wash-
52See Part I supra.53Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law (1939) 24 CORNEI.L L. Q. 337, 355.54The part played by the Prohibition Act in the adoption of the rule of the Weeks
case is discussed by Waite, Reasonable Search and Research (1938) 86 U. PA. L. REv.
623; Roberts, Does the Search and Seizure Clause Hinder the Proper Adhinistration of
the Crinmial Justice? (1929) 5 Wis. L. REv. 195; Wilson, Attempts to Nullify ite
Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the' Constitution (1925) 32 W. VA. L. Q. 128.55Plumb, Illegal Enforcemt of the Law (1939) 24 CORNELL L. Q. 337, 356.56Note (1923) 24 A. L. R. 1408, 1417.57Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Law of Search and Seizure (1928) 13 MINN.
L. REv. 1.58 Note (1936) 16 BosToN U. L. REv. 480.5PMathis v. State, 153 Fla. 750, 15 So. (2d) 762 (1943).6oState v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 Pac. 788 (1927).61People v. Grod, 385 Ill. 584, 53 N. E. (2d) 591 (1944).62Vukadanovich v. State, 205 Ind. 34, 185 N. E. 641 (1933).63Toncray v. Commonwealth, 296 Ky. 400, 177 S. W. (2d) 376 (1944).
64People v. Stein, 265 Mich. 610, 251 N. W. 788 (1933). Art. II, § 10 of the Michi-
gan Constitution, adopted in 1936, provides that certain illegally seized evidence is
admissible. See note 51 supra.65Cochran v. State, 191 Miss. 273, 2 So. (2d) 822 (1941). An attempt by the Legis-
lature to provide that evidence seized without proper search warrants should be admis-
sible in prosecutions under the Mississippi prohibition law, was held unconstitutional
in Orick v. State, 140 Miss. 184, 105 So. 465 (1925).66State v. Wilkerson, 349 Mo. 205, 159 S. W. (2d) 794 (1942).67State ex rel. Stange v. District Court, 71 Mont. 125, 227 Pac. 576 (1924).68Dade v. State, 188 Okla. 677, 112 P. (2d) 1102 (1941).
GPState v. McDaniel, 115 Ore. 187, 231 Pac. 965 (1925).70State v. McClendon, 64 S. D. 320, 266 N. W. 672 (1936).71Parker v. State, 177 Tenn. 380, 150 S. W. (2d) 725 (1941).72The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (Vernon, 1941) art. 727a provides: "No
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ington,7 3 West Virginia,7 4 Wisconsin, 75 and Wyoming.76 Alaska also follows
the federal rule.7 7 A statute in Maryland, enacted in 1935, provides for the
exclusion of illegally seized evidence in misdemeanor cases, 78 but such evi-
dence is still admissible in felony cases.79 North Carolina attempted to adopt
the federal rule by statute in 1937,80 but it was so drafted that the courts
held that evidence obtained under an illegal warrant is inadmissible, while
evidence obtained illegally without any warrant is admitted."' The states in
which illegally obtained evidence is held admissible are still in the majority.
They are Alabama,8 2 Arizona,83 Arkansas,8 4 California,8 5 Colorado,8 6 Connec-
ticut,8 7 Delaware,8 8 Georwia,8 9 Iowa,90 Kansas, 91 Louisiana,92 Maine,93 Mas-
sachusetts, 94 Minnesota,9 5 Nebraska, 96 Nevada,97 New Hampshire, 98 New
Jersey,9 9 New Mexico, 00 Nevw York,1 1 North Dakota,z°  Ohio,10 3 Pennsyl-
evidence' obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the
Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution of the United States
of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any
criminal case."73State v. Raum, 172 Wash. 680, 21 P. (2d) 291 (1933).74State v. Lacy, 118 W. Va. 345, 190 S. E. 344 (1937).75Mularkey v. State, 196 Wis. 400, 220 N. W. 234 (1928).76State v. Scott, 41 Wyo. 438, 286 Pac. 390 (1930).77United States v. Doumain, 7 Alaska 31 (4th Div. 1923).78 MD. ANN. CODE (Flack, 1939) art. 35, 5.
79Marshall v. State, 182 Md. 379, 35 A. (2d) 115 (1943).80
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§ 15-27.
81State v. McGee, 214 N. C. 184, 198 S. E. 616 (1938).82Banks v. State, 207 Ala. 179, 93 So. 293 (1921).83State v. Frye, 58 Ariz. 409, 120 P. (2d) 793 (1942).84Woolem v. State, 179 Ark. 1119, 20 S. W. (2d) 185 (1929).
'
85People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal. (2d) 165, 124 P. (2d) 44 (1942), cert. denied, 317
U. S. 657, 63 Sup. Ct. 155 (1942).86Massantonio v. People, 77 Colo. 392, 236 Pac. 1019 (1925).87State v. Carol, 120 Conn. 573, 181 Atl. 714 (1935).88State v. Episcopo, 37 Del. 439, 184 Atl. 872 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1936).89McIntyre v. State, 190 Ga. 872, 11 S. E. (2d) 5 (1940).9
°State v. Nelson, 231 Iowa 177, 300 N. W. 685 (1941).9 1 State v. Kelley, 125 Kan. 805, 265 Pac. 1109 (1928).9 2 State v. Fleckinger, 152 La. 337, 93 So. 115 (1922).9 3 State v. Burroughs, 72 Me. 479 (1881).9 4 Commonwealth v. Wilkins, 243 Mass. 356, 138 N. E. 11 (1923).
9 5 State' v. Siporen, 215 Minn. 438, 10 N. W. (2d) 353 (1943).9 6Kuxhaus v. State, 117 Neb. 514, 221 N. W. 439 (1928).9 7Terrano v. State, 59 Nev. 247, 91 P. (2d) 67 (1939).
9 8 State v. Agalos, 79 N. H. 241, 107 Atl. 314 (1919).9 9 State v. Merra, 103 N. J. L. 361, 137 Atl. 575 (1927).
10oState v. Dillon, 34 N. M. 366, 281 Pac. 474 (1929).
101People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926). The law of New York
is discussed infra Part V.
102 State v. Fahn, 53, N. D. 203, 205 N. W. 67 (1925).
'
0 3 State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N. E. (2d) 490 (1936), appeal dismissed
for want of jurisdiction, 299 U. S. 506, 57 Sup. Ct. 36 (1.936).
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vania, 0 4 South Carolina, 10 5 Utah,10  Vermont,' 0 7 and Virginia. 0 8  Rhode
Island has not yet ruled on the question, although a dictum indicates that it
favors the majority rule.10 9 The controversial nature of the question is vividly
illustrated by the development of the rule in some of the states. Its history
is marked by the same vacillation and divided courts characteristic of the
decisions in the United States Supreme Court.
PART III
The Federal Law of Wire Tapping
A. The Olmstead Case
The first stage of the history of the federal law of wire tapping is con-
cerned chiefly with the admissibility of wire tapped evidence under the
Fourth Amendment. The 'second stage, beginning with the decision in Nar-
done v. United States'" in 1937 deals with its admissibility under section
605 of the Federal Communications Act.
The history begins in 1928,"' when the United States Supreme Court
was squarely faced with the question whether evidence secured by federal
law enforcement officers by tapping telephone wires of the accused was ad-
missible in-criminal proceedings against him. The division of opinion which
had marked the development of the law as to admissibility of illegally seized
evidence also appeared in this phase of the controversy. By a majority of
five to four, the Court in Olmstead v. United States,"2 held the evidence
admissible, not, however, because it considered, contrary to the Weeks de-
cision, that evidence secured in contravention of the Fourth Amendment
should be received, but for the reason that wire tapping is not a "search"
or "seizure" within the meaning of that Amendment. Defendants had been
convicted in the District Court for the Western District of Washington of
a conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act. The facts disclosed
'
0 4Commonwealth v. Dabbierio, 290 Pa. 174, 138 AtI. 679 (1927).
'
05West Greenville v. Harris, 159 S. C. 524, 157 S. E. 836 (1931).
'
0 6 State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 Pac. 704 (1923).0 7 State v. O'Brien, 106 Vt. 97, 170 Atl. 98 (1934).
1 0 8Hall v. Commonwealth ex reL. South Boston, 138 Va. 727, 121 S. E. 154 (1924).
'
0 9 State v. Chester, 46 R. I. 485, 129 Atl. 596 (1925).
110302 U. S. 379, 58 Sup. Ct. 275 (1937).
"'Prior to this, the only federal law on the subject was a statute passed by Congress
in 1918 prohibiting all wire tapping in order to protect 'the secrecy of government
communications. 40 STAT. 1017 (1918). This was operative only during the period of
governmental operation of the telephone and telegraph systems. Accordingly it expired
in 1919 when these properties were returned to privately owned companies. Wire tap-
ping, Congress, and the Department of Justice (1941) 9 INT. JURID. ASS'N. BULL. 97.
112277 U. S. 438, 48 Sup. Ct. 564 (1928).
1947]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
that they conducted a liquor business on a million dollar scale. The evidence
leading to their conviction was obtained largely by intercepting messages
on the telephones of the conspirators by federal prohibition officers. Th tap-
ping was done witiout committing any trespass upon the property of the
defendants. The majority of the Court, by Mr. Chief Justice Taft, reviewed
its previous decisions relating to illegally seized evidence and found "the misuse
of governmental power of compulsion" a common element of all. The Court
declared that Goided v. United States carried the inhibition against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures to the "extreme limit", but pointed out that
even in that case "there was actual entrance into the private quarters of
defendant and the taking away of something tangible". By contrast, the
Olmstead case involved only "voluntary conversations secretly overheard".
The Court's reasoning ran as follows: the protection afforded by the Fourth
Amendment extended only to the material things enumerated-to one's per-
son, or his house, papers or effects. The words "search" and "seizure" can-
not be construed to prohibit gathering of evidence by hearing or sight. One
who speaks over a telephone from his house intends to project his voice be-
yond his house and messages passing over these wires are not within the
protection of the Fourth Amendment. There was no infringement of de-
fendant's rights under the Fifth Amendment either on the ground (stated
in the Boyd case) that the Fourth had been violated, or independently of
the Fourth, since the defendant's conversations were completely voluntary.
The Court rejected the argument that the evidence should be held inad-
missible because the method of obtaining it was unethical. This would be
not only at variance with the common law doctrine but also contrary to
general experience that evidence in criminal cases is frequently "not ob-
tained by conformity to the highest ethics".
Finally since the wire tapping was done in the State of Washington, the
Court referred to the Washington statute which provided that "Every person
•.. who shall intercept, read or in any manner interrupt or delay the send-
ing of a message over any telegraph or telephone line . .. shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor", n 3 The majority opinion pointed out that the statute did
not declare evidence obtained by its violation inadmissible, and that, even
if federal officers were punishable thereunder, a statute passed twenty years
after the admission of the state into the Union could not affect federal rules
of evidence. Having held that the law of evidence of the State of Washington
did not control, the Court further held with reference to the violation of the
11 3WAsi. CoIxP. STAT. AxN. (Remington's, 1922) § 2656-18.
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Washington statute, that the federal law of evidence was that of the common
law, which ignores the illegality 9f the methods by which the evidence may
have been obtained. The Court concluded that the illegal act of the federal
officers in obtaining the evidence by wire tapping, did not affect its admis-
sibility.
Mr. Justice Holmes, in a dissenting opinion, without deciding whether the
case came within the scope of the Fourth or Fifth Amendment, expressed
the belief that the Government should not make use of evidence obtained
by any criminal act. "No distinction can be taken between the Government
as prosecutor and the Government as judge. If the existing code does not
permit district attorneys to have a hand in such dirty business it does not
permit the judge to allow such iniquities to succeed"." 14
The disent of Mr. Justice Brandeis rested principally on the belief that
the words of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments should not be read so literally,
that they do not protect the right of privacy which they were framed to safe-
guard. They, should be interpreted to prevent the "subtler and more far-
reaching means *of invading privacy""u 5 which have become available to the
Government since the adoption of these Amendments. Independently of the
constitutional question, he agreed with Mr. Justice Holmes that the Govern-
ment should not obtain a conviction through illegal acts of its own officers.
He believed that the equitable doctrine denying relief to one who comes into
court with unclean hands should be extended to criminal cases in order to
maintain respect for the law and promote confidence in the administration
of justice. Mr. Justice Butler pointed out in his dissent that wire tapping
constituted a physical interference with the wires which was literally a search.
If the interception of messages was not literally a seizure, still he was of
the opinion that it was within the spirit of the constitutional guaranty of
the Fourth Amendment. Mr. Justice Stone also wrote a brief dissenting.
opinion.
The Ohnstead case again emphasized that the Supreme Court was wedded
to the common law doctrine of admission of evidence illegally obtained. It
was immaterial that the evidence in question was secured by federal officers
through commission of a misdemeanor under state statute. So.long as no
infraction of a constitutional guaranty was involved, bringing the case within
the exception to the rule established by the Weeks case, the evidence was
admissible. Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis pleaded for an
114277 U. S. 438, 470, 48 Sup. Ct. 564, 575 (1928).115Id. at 473, 48 Sup. Ct. at 570.
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overthrow of the common law rule in all cases where the illegal act was
committed by public officers, whether that act was a violation of a statute
or constitutional provision. Aside from the considerations of policy, to be
,discussed later in this study,116 this was the logical position to assume; if
a preliminary motion opened the way for consideration of this "collateral"
issue in search and seizure cases, it could do the same in cases of statutory
violations. 117
The other basis for decision of the Olnstead case, that wire tapping was
not a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, finds
some support in analogous decisions. In general, securing evidence by use
of the senses, 'as through sight or hearing, without further exploration of
hidden places, does not constitute a search, and this is true even though the
senses are aided by a device such as a flashlight or dictaphone." 8 Eaves-
dropping has been a method frequently employed by* the police to secure
evidence of crime, and the disrepute in which it is generally held has not
preventedthe courts from admitting the evidence so obtained." 9 This method
is so thoroughly accepted that in some cases, the evidence obtained apparently
has not been challenged by the defense on the basis of illegality. 2 0
116Infra Part VI.
1 7 Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Law of Search and Seizure (1928) 13 MINN.
L. REv. 1.
"
5 United States v. Lee, 274 U. S. 559, 47 Sup. Ct. 746 (1927) (flashing light on
boat by officers of coast guard held not a search). "Such use of a searchlight, is com-
parable to the use of a marine glass or a field glass." Id. at 563, 47 Sup. Ct. at 748;
Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57, 44 Sup. Ct. 445 (1924) (officers from concealed
position in field saw defendant with whiskey bottle) ; Burt v. United States, 139 F.
(2d) 73 (C. C. A. 5th, 1943) (officer saw whiskey cans through open door) ; Smith
v. United States, 2 F. (2d) 715 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924) (officers turned flashlight on
floor of car and saw liquor; it is "not a search to observe that which is open and patent,
in either sunlight or artificial light." Id. at 716.) Safarik v. United States, 62 F. (2d)
892 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933) held that flashing a light through the window of a chicken
coop was not an "unreasonable search." See note 119 infra for dictaphone cases.
119United States v. Harnish, 7 F. Supp. 305 (N. D, Me. 1934) (radio direction finder);
People v. Cotta, 49 Cal. 166 (1874) (police officer listened to conversation in de-
fendant's cell) ; Goode v. State, 158 Miss. 616, 131 So. 107 (1930) (sheriff overheard
conversation from road) ; State v. Hester, 137 S. C. 145, 134 S. E. 885 (1926) (police
used detectaphone to eavesdrop on conversation in defendant's cell) ; Hunter v. State,
111 Tex. Cr. App. 252, 12 S. W. (2d) 566 (1928) (police listened at window).
Eavesdropping was an indictable offense at common law. 4 BL. Comml. 168, 2 WHAR-
TON, CRIMINAL LAw (12th ed. 1932) § 1718. It is still punishable as a statutory offense
in some states. See, for instance, GA. CODE ANX. (1935) §26-§2001; MAss. ANN. LAws
(1942) Ch. 272, § 99; S. C. CODE (194Z) §1192-1.
'
2 OWallace v. United States, 291 Fed. 972 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923) (wire tapping);
Schoborg v. United States, 264 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 6th, 1920) (dictograph) ; People v.
Schultz, 18 Cal. App. (2d) 485, 64 P. (2d) 440 (1937) (dictaphone) ; Kidd v. People,
97 Colo. 480, 51 P. (2d) 1020 (1935) (dictograph);. Commonwealth v. Wakelin, 230
Mass. 567, 120 N. E. 209 (1918) (conversation in defendant's cell overheard by dicto-
graph).
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The physical interference with the wires which is necessary in wire tapping
distinguishes it from cases of securing evidence by seeing or hearing, and
therefore, may more aptly be held a "search". Nothing tangible is carried
away, however, so that it does not literally constitute a "seizure". In this
respect, it differs from interception of letters and packages in the mails, which
have been held to be within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.' 2' The
view that sealed letters may not be seized indiscriminately was a stumbling
block to the majority in the Olmstead case, inasmuch as this form of inter-
ference, as may be true in wire tapping, occurs outside the sacred precincts
of the curtilage. It was overcome, however, by the argument that the post
office is directly under protection of the United States Government, and that
mail is within the meaning of "papers and effects".
While it is probably true that the framers of the Constitution contemplated
seizure only of tangible things in drafting the Fourth Amendment because
other forms of seizure were unknown at the time, still, the force of Mr.
Justice Brandeis' argument that protection against wire tapping is within
the spirit of the Amendment' cannot be denied. The. history of the Amend-
ment discloses that it was included in the Bill of Rights on the insistence
of the states because of a strong opinion that it was necessary to safeguard.
homes against governmental intrusion so fearfully exemplified by use of the
general warrant in England and of Writs of Assistance in the American
Colonies.122 The right which the Amendment was intended to protect in
its largest sense was the right of privacy, and telephone messages would seem
as deserving of protection in this respect as letters or papers. In fact, eaves-
dropping on private conversations has been held by at least two courts to
be an invasion of the right of privacy for which damages may be recovered
in a civil suit. 23
It is possible that the Court in the Olmstead case decided the issue in favor
of constitutionality in order to permit Congress to regulate wire tapping or
outlaw it in accordance with the rise or ebb of the crime wave. A contrary
1 2 1Hoover v. McChesney, 81 Fed. 47z (C. C. D. Ky. 1897) ; and see Ex parte Jackson,
96 U. S. 727, 735 (1877).1 2 2GREENJN!AN, WIRE TAPPING, ITS RELATION TO CIVIL LIBERTIES (1938) 5; Harno,
Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure (1925) 19 ILL. L. REV. 303. See Boyd
v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 625, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, 529 (1886) for the classic statement
of the origin of the Fourth Amendment.
123 McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S. E. (2d) 810
(1939) (listening by dictaphone to conversation in hospital room) ; Rhodes v. Graham,
238 Ky. 225, 37 S. W. (2d) 46 (1931) (wire tapping by private individuals). But see
United States v. Goldman, 118 F. (2d). 310, 314 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1941) where the court
said, "There was only an instance of eavesdropping which alone, though an invasion
of privacy, is not a violation of a recognized legal right to privacy."
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holding would have shut the door to any statutory relaxation allowing even
supervised wire tapping. If the Court was influenced by this policy, it could
reach its result only on the basis chosen, that wire tapping is not a search
or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. If it were held a
search, it must be an unreasonable search, since wire tapping seldom has a
purpose other than the procurement of evidence, which was held unconsti-
tutional in the Gouled case.1 24 And evidence secured by an unreasonable
search is constitutionally inadmissible under the holding of the Weeks case. 12 5 "
B. Interpretation of Sectio.n. 605, of the Federal Communications Act.
In 1934, Congress passed the Federal Communications Act, which super-
seded the Federal Radio Commission Act and brought wire and radio com-
munications under tle control of the newly created Federal Communications
Commission.126 The new act repealed Section 27 of the Radio Act of 1927,
which had provided: "No person not being authorized by the sender shall
intercept any message and divulge or publish the contents, substance, purport,
effect, or meaning of such intercepted message to any person.' 27 In its stead,
Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act was enacted.128 This is set
-forth below with its four clauses indicated by bracketed numbers for ready
reference in discussion of the cases interpreting it:
Section 605. "Unauthorized publication or use of communications.
[1] No person receiving or assisting in receiving, or transmitting, or
assisting in transmitting, any interstate or foreign communication by
wire or radio shall divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect, or meaning thereof, except through authorized channels
of transmission or reception, to any person other than the addressee, his
agent, or attorney, or to a person employed or authorized to forward
such communication to its 'destination, or to proper accounting or dis-
tributing officers of the various communicating centers over which com-
munication may be passed, or to the master of a ship under whom he
is serving, or in response to a subpoena issued by a court of competent
jurisdiction, or in demand of other lawful authority; [2] and no person
not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication
and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect,
or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person; [3] and
124Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261 (1921). Later cases to
the same effect were Go-Bart Importihg Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 644, 51 Sup.
Ct. 153 (1931) ;'United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 52 Sup. Ct. 420 (1932).
125Note (1940) 53 HARv. L. REv. 863.
12648 STAT. 1064 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. § 151 (Supp. 1946).
12744 STAT. 1172 (1927).
12848 STAT. 1103'(1934), 47 U. S. C. A. § 605 (Supp. 1946).
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no person not being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving
any interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio and use the
same or any information therein contained for his own benefit or for
the benefit of another not entitled thereto, [4] and no person having re-
ceived such intercepted communication or having become acquainted
with the contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or
any part thereof, knowing that such information was so obtained, shall
divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of the same or any part therecf, or use the same or any infor-
mation therein contained for his own benefit or for the benefit of another
not entitled thereto: Provdded, That this section shall not apply to the
receiving, divulging, publishing, or utilizing the contents of any radio
communication broadcast, or transmitted by amateurs or others for the
use of the generalopublic, or relating to ships in distress."'128
Section 501 of the Act made the wilful -and knowing violation of this sec-
tion punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000.00 or by imprisonment
for a term of not more than two years or both.129
Section 605 received little notice for several years. Now, as before, the
only question relating to wire tapped evidence which was presented to the
Federal Courts was its admissibility under the Constitution or under state
statute. As to this, the courts, relying on the Olmstead case, received the
evidence without much discussion.' 30 The only case in which the question
of. admissibility of evidence under Section 605 was presented, ruled in the
affirmative without discussing the point1 31
Into this placid scene was injected the decision in Nardone v. United
States.132 The defendants, under indictment for smuggling alcohol, objected
to testimony of federal agents to the substance of interstate communications
overheard by them through tapping of telephone wires. The Supreme Court,
reversing' the judgment of conviction, held that under the second clause of
Section 605, "no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept
128AIbid.
12948 STAT. 1100 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A., § 501 (Supp. 1946).
130 Valli v. United States, 94 F. (2d) 687 (C. C. A. 1st, 1938); United States v.
Genello, 10 F. Supp. 751 (M. D. Pa. 1935), Rev'd Ment.; United States v. Jenello,
78 F. (2d) 1020 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935) ; Foley v. United States, 64 F. /(2d) 1 (C. C. A.
5th, 1933) ; Kerns v. United States, 50 F. (2d) 602 (C. C. 'A. 6th, 1931). See Beard
v. United States, 82 F. (2d) 837 (App. D. C. 1936), cert. denied 298 U. S. 655, 56 Sup.
Ct. 675 (1936) ; In re Milburne, 77 F. (2d) 310 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1935) ; Bushouse v.
United States, 67 F. (2d) 843 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933) ; Morton v. United States, 60 F. (2d)
696 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932). The last case held that it was error in order to discredit a
government witness and show that he was over-zealous, not to permit his cross exami-
nation concerning his knowledge that he was violating a state statute in tapping tele-
phone conversations.
1 31Smith v. United States, 91 F. (2d) 556 (App. D. C. '1937).
132302 U. S. 379, 58 Sup. Ct. 275 (1937).
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any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect br meaning of such intercepted communication to any person",
the phrase "no person" comprehends federal agents and that "the ban on
communication to 'any person' bars testimony to the content of an inter-
cepted message". The United States had urged a contrary interpretation on
the grounds: (1) That Congress, as evidenced by its refusal to adopt legis-
lation outlawing wire tapping subsequent to the Olnzstead decision and by
the history of Section 605, did not intend to regulate the introduction of
wire tapped evidence; (2) That general words in a statute are not applicable
to the government; and (3) That the statute should not be given an inter-
pretation which would impede the detection and punishment of crime. The
Court acknowledged that several bills introduced in Co}igress forbidding the
practice of wire tapping had failed to pass' 33 (with one exception applicable
only tothe enforcement of the National Prohibition Act).13 It also admitted
that "the committee reports in connection with the Federal Communications
Act dwell upon the fact that the major purpose of the legislation was the
transfer of jurisdiction over wire and radio communication to the newly
constituted Federal Communications Commission." It nevertheless concluded
that the plain words of the statute forbade government agents to tap wires
and divulge the information thus secured in court. It found this conclusion
reenforced by the provision in the first clause of. Section 605, applicable to
employees of the carrier, permitting divulgence in answer to a lawful sub-
poena, whereas this provision was omitted from the second clause, concern-
ing intercepted messages.
The Court overrode the second contention of the United States by holding
that an exception'to the doctrine that general words of a statute do not in-
dude the government is found where the statute is "intended to prevent
injury and wrong".
In answer to the last argument, it was stated that "Congress may have
thought it less important that some offenders should go unwhipped of justice
than that officers should resort to methods deemed inconsistent with ethical
standards and destructive of personal liberty. The same considerations may
well have moved the Congress to adopt Section 605 as evoked the guaranty
against practices and procedures violative of privacy, embodied in the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution".
133H. R. 23, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. 5305, S. 1896, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1931).
13447 STAT. 1381 (1933). This was a provision in an appropriation bill that none of
the funds thereby appropriated should be used for wire tapping to procure evidence of
violation of the National Prohibition Act.
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Mr. Justice Sutherland, dissenting, expressed the belief that the decision
would enable "the most depraved criminals to further their criminal plans
over the telephone; in the secure knowledge that even if these plans involve
kidnapping and murder, their telephone messages can never be intercepted
by officers of the lav and. revealed in court". He considered the words of
the statute not sufficiently definite to bring about such an extreme result.
The criticism of the Nardone case has sometimes been voiced that it read
into the statute a provision which Congress did not intend to include.13 5 It
is, in fact, true that the legislative history of Section 605 gives no inkling
that Congress was therein dealing with a highly controversial rule of evi-
dence. The debates in Congress contain no reference to it, and the Com-
mittee report barely recognizes its presence by stating that it "is based
upon Section 27 of the Radio Act and extends it to wire communications."' 13 6
This virtual silence on a question which normally elicits a flood of arguments,
seems to indicate that Congress had no intention of legislating on this point.
Moreover, it was not ineluctable to hold that a statute, general in terms,
designed to prevent injury and wrong, includes the acts of the government
or public officers. In the case of other general statutes defining rights and
duties, the courts have sometimes held that governmental conduct is not
covered. For instance, speed regulations are held inapplicable to public of-
ficers pursuing a criminal. 13 7 The Court therefore had sound precedent for
deciding that a statute forbidding disclosure of wire tapped evidence was
inapplicable to public officers endeavoring to convict a criminal. Neither
was the Court forced irresistibly to the conclusion that the prohibition against
"divulging" wire tapped conversations includes giving testimony of these
conversations. Statutes forbidding telegraph operators to make known the
contents of messages have been held not to prevent their testifying to their
contents.
38
These considerations throw light on a statement in -a later Supreme Court
case that the decision in Nardoanie v. United States "was not the product of
a merely meticulous reading of technical language. It was the translation
13 5Notes (1940) 53 HARv. L. REv. 863; (1940) 34 ILL. L. REV. 758; (1939) 16
TEX. L. REv. 574.
136 SEN. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 11.
'
37Lilly v. West Virginia, 29 F. (2d) 61 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928); Edberg v. Johnson,
149 Minn. 395, 184'N. W. 12 (1921); State v. Gorham, 110 Wash. 330, 188 Pac. 457
(1920).
138 Hall v. State, 208 Ala. 199, 201, 94 So. 59, 61 (1922) ("communicate in any
way whatsoever" forbidden) ; Woods & Bradley v. Miller & Co., 55 Iowa 168 (1880) ;
Henisler v. Freedman, 2 Pars. Sel. Cas. 274 (Pa. 1851) ("unlawful divulgence" pro-
hibited).
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into practicality of broad considerations of morality and public well-being."'1 39
It is significant that the Court, swayed as it was purely by considerations
of policy, reached an opposite result from the Otutstead case. It was, of
course, able to do so without overruling its earlier decision because in the
Nardone case it was interpreting the language of a statute, rather than the
wording of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.140 Nevertheless, it weighed
the same considerations-facilitation of the conviction of the criminal as
against a danger of infringement of the right of privacy-and came to a dif-
ferent conclusion. The effect of its decision was, however, 'much more sweep-
ing than an overruling of the Ornstead case, which would have excluded
evidence of intercepted messages only in criminal cases, and only when a
federal officer was'instrumental in securing the evidence. The Nardone de-
cision has the effect of forbidding evidence of intercepted messages in all
proceedings of any nature and whether, obtained by a federal agent, the local
police or a private individual.' 41
It is interesting to note that the ruling in the Nardone case, far-reaching
though it was, did not shake the adherence of the Supreme Court to the
basic rule of evidence that a court will not interrupt a tiial to determine
the legality of the source of evidence. The court in the Nardone case was
interpreting a statute which expressly forbade "divulgence" of certain infor-
mation. The Court for reasons of .policy construed this to prohibit testimony
in a court of law. The Nardnte decision is concerned solely with outlawing
wire tapped evidence obtained in violation of Section 605, and cannot be
construed as altering generally the common law rule holding evidence il-
legally obtained to be admissible-a rule which the Supreme Court had not
questioned except in cases involving the Constitution.
The interpretation of Section 605 in the Nardone case brought this pro-
vision into sudden prominence. It was relied upon by the defense in several
cases which reached the circuit courts in the next few years. When the
question was squarely presented, the courts reversed the convictions on the
authority of the Nardone decision.142
'
39Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 340, '60 Sup. Ct. 266, 267 (1939).
140That the Nardone decision was concerned only with statutory interpretation is the
basis of the decision in Beard v. Sanford, 110 F. (2d) 527 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940)
in which a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus, convicted by wire tapped evidence,
urged the first Nardone case, decided lafter his conviction, as a reason for granting the
writ. The petition was denied on the ground that no constitutional right was involved
in the Nardone case, and a mere statutory right did not furnish a basis for a writ of
habeas corpus.14 1 GREENMAN, WIRE TAPPING, ITs RELATION TO CIVIL LIBERTIES (1938) 33; note
(1940) 53 HARv. L. Rm. 863.
142United States v. Bonanzi, 94 F. (2d) 570 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) ; United States v.
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The Supreme Court shortly after the Nardone decision had occasion again
to interpret the scope of Section 605, and in the case of the same offenders.'43
In a new trial - following the first decision, Nardone and his co-defendants
were convicted. On appeal, the principal question was whether the trial judge
"improperly refused to allow the accused to examine the prosecution as to
the uses to which it had put the information unlawfully obtained"; that is,
whether the prosecution was seeking to introduce evidence indirectly pro-
cured through information contained in the intercepted telephone conver-
sations. 1 44 The Circuit Court, by Judge Learned Hand, held that no error
had been committed, for Section 605, while forbidding the divulgence of the
contents of tapped messages, did not forbid the divulgence of information
indirectly secured from such messages. The Court expressed its fear that
permission to the accused to investigate the source of all evidence offered
by the prosecution would handicap the prosecution hopelessly. It stated that
if it should allow such a procedure, the doctrine that evidence procured by
an illegal search is incompetent, might also be subject to the same broad
interpretation.
The Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court. It did not attempt to
justify its decision by an examination of the wordihg of Section 605. It
weighed the opposing considerations, "on the one hand, the stern enforcement
of the criminal law, on the other, protection of that realm of privacy left
free by Constitution and laws but capable of infringement either through zeal
or design." It decided that the holding below "would largely stultify the policy
which compelled" the decision in the first Nardone case by allowing the
methods condemned by the statute a large field of usefulness. It pointed out,
however, that the connection between the wire tapping and the evidence
"may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint". The Court went
on to formulate a procedure to be followed by a trial court where a similar
Bernava, 95 F. (2d) 310 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); United States v. Reed, 96 F. (2d) 785
(C. C. A. 2d, 1938) ; see United States v. Jenello, 102 F. (2d) 587 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939) ;
Ginsberg v. United States, 96 F. (2d) 433 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) ; and cases cited infra
note 151 in which the additional question of the applicability of § 605 to intrastate com-
munications was decided.
In United States v. Gallo, 123 F. (2d) 229 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1941) ; the defendant ob-jected to the reception in evidence of records of the telephone company showing calls
between himself and two co-defendants. The court held that admission of these records
would not constitute a violation of § 605, for, even if recording of calls by the company
could be deemed an interception, the parties to ihe call would have been deemed to
consent to this well established practice.
143Nardone v. United States; 308 U. S. 338, 60 Sup. Ct. (266 (1939).
144The briefs disclose that the question arose when Nardone sought to strike the
testimony of certain government 'witnesses on the ground that the government had
discovered the existence of these witnesses by wire tapping.
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question should be raised. "The burden is, of course, on the accused in the
first instance to prove to the trial court's satisfaction that wire tapping was
unlawfully employed. Once that is established . . . the trial judge must
give opportunity, however closely confined, to the accused to prove that a
substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the poisonous tree.
This leaves ample opportunity to the Government to convince the trial court
that its proof had an independent origin". It recognized the soundness of
the objection raised by the. Circuit Court to forcing the prosecution to a
wholesale disclosure of its evidence before submission to the jury, but thought
that the experience of a trial judge would enable him to distinguish between
a genuine claim that a portion of the Government's evidence was tainted and
a baseless attempt to extract information from the prosecution. The Court
invoked the exception to the rule of seasbnable objection established in the
Gauled case by stating that if the defendant's claim should be made after
the trial has commenced, the judge must "be satisfied that the accused could
not at an earlier stage have had adequate knowledge to make his claim".
In the instant case, the Court did not question the timeliness of the defen-
dant's objection to the proof since the Circuit Court did not. Mr. justice
McReynolds dissented from these views on the grounds stated in the opinion
of the Circuit Court.
The decision in the second Nardove decision imports into the law of wire
tapping the rule previously enunciated by the Supreme Court in the Silver-
thorne case as to evidence secured by illegal search and seizure, that the un-
lawful act not only vitiates the evidence seized, but extends to all information
traceable to such act.145 As the Court said in the Silvertharne case, "The
essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way
is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court
but that it shall not be used at all". 146 This result necessarily follows from
the reason of the rules, that illegal searches and seizures on the one hand
and securing wire tapped evidence in contravention of a statute on the other,
are to be discouraged as violative of personal liberties by removing any
incentive to employing them.1 47
.
4
-
5 See discussion Part II A, supra.
146251 U. S. 385, 392, 40 Sup: Ct. 182, 183 (1920).
'1 471t has been suggested (Note (1940) 53 HARv. L. REV. 863, 867) that the Supreme
Court overlooked the analogy found in those decisions which, though refusing to receive
an improperly induced confession, allow the introduction in evidence of facts, such as
the finding of a bQdy or stolen goods, discovered in consequence of information con-
tained in the confession' of "the accused. State v. Turner, 82 Kan. 787, 109 Pac. 654(01910) ; 3 WIGMORE,. EVIDENCE (3d ed. .1940) § 856- § 859. Improperly induced confessions
are excluded, however, 'because they are untrustworthy. This objection does not extend
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The language of the Court in fixing the burden of proof in wire tapping
cases is not definite, and it has not been clarified by later decisions of the
Supreme Court. The Second Circuit, in interpreting the language in the
second Nardone case, in United States v. Goldstein , 48 decided that the state-
ment that the Government would have ample opportunity "to convince the
trial court that its proof had an independent origin" indicated that once the
defendant made out a prima facie case showing tapping had been used to
some extent and the evidence it had produced, the final burden rested on
the government to refute this charge. It cited the analogy of the rule which
in civil cases places on a wrongdoer who has commingled the consequences
of lawful and unlawful conduct, the burden of disentangling them. It pointed
out that it was appropriate for the prosecution to bear the burden since it
possessed the knowledge of how the case was prepared. 49
The second Nardone decision may not exercise the deterrent effect on
federal officers that at first thought appeared probable. If the prosecution
exposes the source of the evidence on trial by seeking to introduce the sub-
stance of intercepted messages, the way is opened for objection by the
defendant. Where, however, the intercepted conversations are used before
trial to secure other evidence, the accused will often be completely unaware
that his wires have been tapped. Or if he is aware, it may be difficult for
him to discover what portion of the government's 'case is traceable to the
information thus secured in order to prove to the trial judge the parts which
should be excluded. He will thus be unable to sustain the burden of making
out a prima facie case which the second Nardone decision seems to impose.
to extraneous facts which can be independently confirmed, and there is no reason to ex-
clude them. The exclusion of evidence derived from wire tapping rests on an entirely
different principle causing the analogy to fail.
148120 F. (2d) 485 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
149The only other case 'discussing the requirements as to satisfying the burden of
proof, laid down by the second Nardone decision was United States v. Pillon, 36 F.
Supp. 567 (E. D. N. Y. 1941). The court 'there denied the defendant's motion for a
hearing preliminary to trial in order to prove the use of wire tapping by government
agents, which had been divulged, according to the defendant before the grand jury.
The prosecution denied this charge. The court refused to inspect the minutes of the
grand jury, to ascertain whether the defendant's charge was well *founded. It stated
however, that no right of the defendant was foreclosed by denial of the motion, for if
it should appear on trial that evidence had been secured by wire tapping, it would be
excluded.
United States v. Gruber, 39 F. Supp. 291 (S. D. N. Y. 1941) denied a motion to
suppress the Government's evidence because there were no facts before the court to
show that the Government had used, or intended to use, wire tapped information.
United States v. Bonanzi, 94 F. (2d) 570 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) decided.bdfore the second
Nardone case, held that, assuming § 605 did not apply to intrastate communications,
the Government bore the burden of showing, at least prima facie, that the wire tapped
conversations by which lit obtained evidence, were part of interstate communications.
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It is conceivable that an over-zealous prosecutor may rely extensively on
wire tapping to lead him to proof which he may present at trial with impunity.
The second Nardone case establishes a shadowy area wherein it is difficult
to distinguish the tainted "evidence from the untainted". If wire tapping
uncovers the commission of a crime which can be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt by independent evidence, does the method of its discovery pre-
clude prosecution? If a witness is present at the scene of a crime because
of information secured from intercepted telephone conversations, may he
testify to what he saw? Is the testimony of a witness admissible if he was
induced to testify by the Government's use of wire tapped information?
These and similar questions were left to the fairness and good sense of the
trial judge. On the last question, however, the Supreme Court. has twice
enunciated its views in the Weiss and Goldstein cases.
In Upited States v. Weiss,150 the defendants were charged with conspiracy
to use the mails to defraud inshrance companies by inducing them to pay
false claims. Evidence was secured by tapping the wires leading to the of-
fices of two of the defendants over a period of months. This was done by
a local police officer under instructions of a federal agent. Stenographic
transcripts and phonograph records were made of the intercepted conver-
sations. The wires tapped were conduits of both intrastate and interstate
communications and calls of both classes were intercepted. One of the de-
fendants became a government witness when confronted with the records
of the intercepted calls. Others did likewise when informed of the intercep-
tions. At the trial, evidence of'the intercepted calls was introduced over
the defendant's objection. The evidence was in the form of the stenographic
and phonographic transcripts, identified as correct by one of the defendants
who had been a party to the call, or in some cases by both defendants where
both had been parties. The records introduced, with one possible exception,
were of intrastate communications.
The Government defended the admissibility of the records of intercepted
calls on the ground that the disclosure was authorized by the sender within
the language of the second clause of Section 605, which permits disclosure
on that condition. The Court held that any "consent" was nullified by two
circumstances: (1) The witnesses were compelled to testify by the fact that
the contents of the messages were known to the government; (2) The wit-
nesses were induced to testify by payment of salary and also by grant of
150308 U. S. 321, 60 Sup. Ct. 269 (1939), reversing United States v. Weiss, 103 F.
(2d)-348 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
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certain favors. This was not the voluntary authorization of disclosure con-
templated by the statute. The Court also referred to the disclosure which
had already occurred when the records of the intercepted conversations were
made available to the United States attorneys before trial. The opinion did
not explain how this could affect the admissibility of the evidence on trial,
although presumably the testimony of the witnesses, 'having been obtained
by means of this unlawful act, would fall within the ban of the second Nardoie
decision relating to all derivative evidence.
The Government further contended that the title to the Federal Com-
munications Act and express provisions in Sections 1 and 2 proved that it
was enacted for the purpose of regulating only interstate and foreign com-
munication. It was also urged that the Radio Act, on which the Communi-
cations Act was based, was limited in this respect, and that there was noth-
ing to show that Congress intended an extension of the jurisdiction under
the former Act. The defendants replied that the first and third clauses of
Section 605, prohibiting disclosures by persons engaged in transmitting them,
were specifically applicable to messages transmitted in interstate or foreign
commerce, and that the absence of this qualifying phrase from the second and
fourth clauses should be construed as extending them to interceptions of
intrastate communications. The defense pointed out that the limitation as
to the first and third clauses was explained by the fact that employees of
communications companies could distinguish between intrastate and inter-
state calls, but that government agents in tapping a wire for an intrastate
communication might overhear an interstate conversation and the protection
afforded by the statute to such calls would thus be lost. The Court, prefer-
ring the defendant's line of reasoning, considered that the different wording
in the sections one and three of Section 605 must have some meaning and
that the stated limitation of the Act to interstate communications applied
only to the Commission's regulatory powers and administrative functions
without extending to the penal provisions of Section 605. While the opinion
contrasts the wording of the first and third clauses with that of the second
and fourth, it specifically states that the question in the case relates to the
second clause. Its holding, therefore, extends only the second clause to
intrastate communications. The fourth clause, which uses the words "such
intercepted communications" seems to be limited to "any interstate or foreign
communication by wire or radio" last mentioned in the third clause.
The Weiss case in deciding that Section 605 prohibited the interception
and divulgence of intrastate conversations, resolved a conflict which had ex-
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isted in the decisions of circuit courts. The third circuit and the sixth circuit
had reached the same result on the basis of reasoning similar to that relied
upon in the Weiss case. 15 ' The first circuit had held to the contrary.
1 2
The holding in the Weiss case was the logical application of the policy
announced in the second Nardone decision. It was intended further to cur-
tail wire tapping by federal officers by preventing the introduction of evi-
dence of intercepted intrastate communications and of conversations to which
one of the parties was induced to testify after the interception occurred. A
contrary holding as to intrastate messages would to a great extent have nul-
lified the effect of the second Nardone decision, for it would have eliminated
from the protection of its rule a large proportion of the number of telephone
calls made. The opposite conclusion permitting a party to an intercepted call
to testify to its contents would have invited wire tapping in the hope that
one of the parties would later be persuaded to testify to the contents of the
conversations.
The interpretation extending Section 605 to intrastate communica-
tions rested on the authority of Congress to regulate intrastate transactions
in pursuance of its power to protect interstate commerce.153 An intercepter
cannot stop his ears to interstate messages and listen only to intrastate con-
versations. It is therefore necessary to prohibit the interception of both in
order to protect the former. The only wire tapping constitutionally outside
the scope of the Weiss decision is that on intra-office lines, which never carry
interstate messages.
The Weiss decision would seem to make all state officers who participated
in interception- of intrastate messages vulnerable to prosecution under penal
provisions of Section 501 of the Communications Act. The act of interception
alone would probably be insufficient for indictment, since the conjunctive
language of the second clause of Section 605 forbidding any unauthorized
person to "intercept any communication and divulge or publish" the contents
indicates that wire tapping if not followed by divulgence is not prohibited. 54
'
5
'Sablowsky v. United States, 101 F. (2d) 183 CC. C. A. 3d, 1938) ; United States
v. Klee, 101 F. (2d) 191 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938); Diamond v. United States, 108 F. (2d)
859 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938). In United States v. Plisco, 22 F. Supp. 242 (D. C. D. C.
1938), the District Court of the District of Columbia had held the evidence of inter-
cepted local messages passing within the District should be suppressed on preliminary
motion as being prohibited by the same policy as dictated the decision in the first
Nardone case.
152Valli v. United States, 94 F. (2d) 687 (C. C. A. 1st, 1938) cert. granted 303 U. S.
632; 58 Sup., Ct. 760 (1938) dismissed on motion, of counsel for petitioners, 304 U. S.
586, 58 Sup. Ct. 1053 (1938).
'
5 3H-ouston, East and West Texas Railway Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342, 34
Sup. Ct. 833 (1914).
154Notes (1940) 34 ILL. L. REv. 758, n. 15; (1940) 30 J. Caml. L. 945, 947.
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An officer who intercepts, however, almost invariably divulges the infor-
mation he has secured to a superior or other officer, thus bringing himself
within the scope of Section 605.'15r Although the federal authorities might
be reluctant to prosecute, a state officer tapping wires under state statute
sanctioning this practice thus places himself in the anomalous position of
enforcing a state law and thereby violating a federal law.
For a time it appeared that the Weiss case had put an end to the use of
intercepted conversations to compel the parties overheard to become Govern-
ment witnesses. This belief was short-lived, however. In another trial of
some of the participants in the same conspiracy involved in the Weiss case,
the Government again presented the testimony of two of the conspirators
who had been induced to testify for the Government when confronted with
intercepted conversations. This time the evidence was held receivable. The
witnesses were parties to some of these messages, but the defendants were
not. The testimony did not include any reference to the intercepted messages.
The Circuit Court for the Second Circuit held in United States v. Goldstein, 56
as already noted in discussion of the second Nardone case, that the final bur-
den of proving that the evidence was not traceable to wire tapping rested
on the prosecution and that this burden had not been sustained. It affirmed
the convictions, however, for the reason that the defendant, not being a party
to the intercepted conversations, had no right under Section 605 to object to
their unlawful use,'0 7 and for the added reason that although the prosecution
had already divulged the information secured by wire tapping to the witnesses,
the indirect use of that information by offering the testimony of those
witnesses was not forbidden by the statute.
The Supreme Court, affirming, by a five to three decision,1 8 considered
that a decision as to which party bore the burden of proof was unnecessary-.
The reasoning of the court below to the effect that defendant, who was not
a party to the tapped conversations, could not object to their use by the prose-
cution was approved. The Court pointed out the well settled law that, even
in the jurisdictions following the Federal rule of exclusion, one not a victim
of an illegal seizure will not be heard to protest against admission of the
155If the "divulgence" takes the form of testimony in a state court, the question arises
whether Congress intended § 605 to regulate the admissibility of evidence in state courts
and if so, whether it was -constitutionally authorized to pass such a regulation. This
question is discussed infra Part IV.
n6120 F. (2d) 485 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941)..
'17The Second Circuit had held to the same effect in United States v. Seeman, 115
F. (2d) 371 (C. -C. A. 2d, 1940).
'
0 8Goldstein v. United States, 316 U. S. 114, 62 Sup. Ct. 1000 (1942).
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evidence secured in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 59 It was of the
opinion that no broader sanction should be applied to the Communications
Act than tor the Constitution. The Court also agreed with the lower court
in holding that since by the terms of the statute, the sender might authorize
divulgence of a message, he was the only one entitled to protection thereunder.
The line of reasoning just stated was an interpretation of the second
clause of Section 605 forbidding any person not authorized by the sender
to intercept and divulge a telephone or telegraph message. The Court also
discussed the purport of the fourth clause which forbids the use of an un-
lawfully intercepted message or any information therein contained by any
person for his own benefit or the benefit of another not entitled thereto.
This had apparently been overlooked by the circuit court. The prose-
cution contended that this clause was not applicable to use of inter-
cepted messages by the Government, but was intended to prevent their
use for the advantage of a private individual. The Court did not decide this
point. It held that, assuming that the Government had been guilty of a vio-
lation of Section 605 in inducing the parties to the intercepted conversation
to testify, this would not "render the testimony so procured inadmissible
against a person not a party to the message." It did not elaborate on this
point, e:cept to remark that it was "the settled common law rule" and in
support thereof it cited that part of the Olnstead opinion which refers to
the Washington wire tapping statute violated by the federal officers in se-
curing evidence for the prosecution in that case and which holds that evidence
is not rendered inadmissible by the illegal manner of its obtention, short of
an infringement of a Constitutional guarantee. The Supreme Court called
attention to the penalties imposed by Section 501 of the Communications
Act in case Government officers had been guilty of an infraction of Section
605.
Mr. Justice Murphy writing the dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice
Stone and Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred, stated that the second Nar-
done case was controlling, since that case like this one, involved evidence
not of the messages themselves, but of other facts to which illegal wire
tapping had led. The dissent contended that the fact that defendants were
not parties to the intercepted messages should not bring about a different
result, and that it was a nonsequitur to conclude that because only a
party to a conversation may authorize its divulgence, he alone may object
I5NThe numerous cases holding evidence admissible under these circumstances are
collected in Notes (1944) 150 A. L. R. 577, (1941) 134 A. L. R. 831, (1934) A. L. R.
365.
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to its illegal interception. The emphasis of the opinion, however, is
placed not on an interpretation of the language of Section 605, but
rather on the policy against wire tapping supposedly underlying the
enactment of that section and its interpretation in previous cases by the
Supreme Court. This policy, it was stated, would be defeated or sub-
stantially impaired under the holding of the majority. The dissent con-
sidered, in fact, that "the opinion of the Court that evidence obtained in
violation of Section 605 is not rendered inadmissible because Section 501
of the Act provides specific sanctions for violations of Section 605, is a direct
repudiation of both Nardone cases and the Weiss case" where "evidence
secured by violation of Section 605 was declared to be inadmissible, despite
the existence of Section 501".160 The series of decisions in the Supreme
Court beginning with the Weeks case rejecting evidence which had been
"procured in violation of federal law by agents of the Government" estab-
lished a principle which, it was implied, should be followed in application
of Section 605.
A comparison of the diverse results in the Goldstein and the second Nar-
done case compels the conclusion that the Supreme Court in the interim be-
tween the two had modified its attitude towards the use of wire tapping
by government agents. The dissent correctly pointed out that the only dis-
tinction between the two cases was that the defendant, tle objecting party,
was a participant in the intercepted conversations in the one instance and
not in the other. Both cases concerned the admissibility of evidence secured
through a violation of Section 605, but not of the contents of the intercepted
conversations. Neither raised the question whether the Court should permit
a violation of the statute at the trial by allowing "divulgence" at that time;
the divulgence or illegal use had occurred beforehand. On the admissibility of
evidence secured by divulgence before trial the statute was silent. The inter-
pretation was dictated not by the terms of the act but purely by considerations
of policy. If the Supreme Court had been consistent in its announced policy
of discouraging wire tapping by limiting the uses to which it could be put,
it would have reached the same conclusion in the Goldstein case as in the
second Nardone case.
The second reason adduced by the majority for its decision, that the illegal
use of intercepted communications by government officers did not invalidate
the evidence so secured, raises a query concerning the result in a case in
which the Government witness was induced to testify by information gained
160316 U. S. 114, 128, 62 Sup. Ct. 1000, 1007 (1942).
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by official interception of messages to which the defendant was a party. The
opinion stated that evidence indirectly procured by a violation of Section 605
is admissible "against a person not a party to the message". From its refer-
ence to the Ohnstead decision, it is clear that it intended to invoke the com-
mon law rule, consistently followed by the Supreme Court when no, qon-
stitutional right is at issue, that a court will not take notice of the manner
in which evidence is obtained. But this rule is applicable and is more
frequently involved when the objecting party is the victim of the il-
legal act. This part of the majority opinion therefore, despite its qualifi-
cation concerning the beneficiary of the rule, lays the groundwork for a
decision admitting the evidence of a person who became state's witness
through use'of wire tapped conversations to which the defendant was a party.
Such a decision would not conflict with the holding in the Weiss case in
which the Government offered in evidence testimony concerning the sub-
stance of the intercepted messages, divulgence of which would have con-
stituted a crime at the trial.
The use of wire tapped information to secure the testimony of a witness
is only one of the avenues opened to enforcement officers by the decision of
the Supreme Court in the Goldstein case reaffirming the ancient common law
rule of admission of evidence regardless of its source. If pursued to its logi-
cal conclusion, thi reasoning would permit the use of wire tapping in many
ways which the second Nardone decision had seemed to foreclose. It would,
in fact, permit introduction of any evidence secured by the use of wire
tapped information before trial.
It seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will ever go farther and relax
its interpretation of Section 605 to such an extent that it will permit recep-
tion of direct evidence of wire tapped conversations, although its reasoning
in the Goldstein case that one, not a party to the intercepted conversations
has no right to object to their use might be applied to such circumstances
with equal cogency. Testifying to the contents of a tapped conversation is
a crime, however, under the prohibition against divulgence in Section 605.
A court would probably refuse to sanction such an act in its presefice even
though objection should be raised by one not a party to the intercepted con-
versations. It seems, therefore, that if the Supreme Court adheres to its
reasoning in the Goldsteib. case, the line between admissibility and inadmis-
sibility of evidence secured in violation of Section 605 may be drawn ac-
cording to the time of occurrence of the illegal act. If before trial, it may
be ignored, but divulgence at the trial will be forbidden.
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The Goldstein case was the first to focus attention on the fourth clause,
the "forbidden use"- clause of Section 605. It did not settle the dispute be-
tween the parties as to whether this prohibition was applicable to federal
officers. There is no more reason to suppose that it would be held inapplicable
than the second clause, which was held to forbid official interception and
divulgence in the first Nardoe case. The question may be of little practical
importance, however, if the Supreme Court adheres to its reasoning in the
Goldstein case. If the admissibility of evidence is in issue, it is immaterial,
according to the Goldstein case, that a crime has been committed by "use"
of intercepted information. In prosecution for violation of Section 605, an
offender who "used" the information' could almost invariably be indicted for
a "divulgence," which is clearly a violation.
Another question involving the interpretation of Section 605 not
discussed in any of the opinions of the Supreme Court arises out of
a favorite method employed by the police in securing evidence of crime.
The facts in the cases deciding this question differ from those in the
Weiss case, only in that the Government witnesses who testified to
the intercepted conversations were collaborating with federal agents at
the time the interceptions occurred. The case most typical and most
enlightening in the exposition of the arguments is United States v.
Polakoff.'61  This was an appeal from a conviction for conspiring to
obstruct justice by securing a lighter sentence for one K, who was under
indictment on a narcotics charge. K voluntarily informed the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation of the plot. Through a telephone in the offices of'the
Bureau, K conversed with each of the accused, who made statements suf-
ficiently damaging to support a conviction. 'The conversations were recorded
upon a machine annexed to an extension in the same circuit as the telephone
K was using. The principal question was the competency of accused's dec-
larations over the telephone. The Government urged the admissibility of
the evidence on the grounds that K as the "sender" of the message within
the meaning of Section 605, had consented to its divulgence, and that in
any event, the recording of the conversation was not an "interception". The
court, by Judge Learned Hand, rejected both arguments. In reply to
the first, it held that in a telephone conversation, each party is alternately
sender and receiver; that it would be "extremely unreal" to hold that each
party had the power to consent to the interception of so much as he said,
161112 F. (2d) 888 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940). United States v. Fallon, 112 F. (2d)
894 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) was a per curiant opinion handed down on the same day and
involving similar facts.
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for "in the interchange each answer may, and often does, imply by reference
some part of that to which it responds"; and that therefore both parties
must consent to the interception of any portion of the conversation. K's
consent to the interception was accordingly held insufficient. The court fur-
ther ruled. that the recording, even though made at an extension and not
by "tapping" a wire was an interception; for it violated the purpose of the
statute, which was to prevent breaches of the right of privacy. Judge Au-
gustus Hand wrote a concurring opinion to the effect that the case before
the court was governed by the Nardone cases and the Weiss case, but ex-
pressed the belief that the prohibition against wire tapping to detect criminal
activities imposes "great and at times insurmountable obstacles upon the pros-
ecuting authorities in the detection and prosecution of crime". He also
stated that he saw no "fundamental difference between evidence obtained
in this way and by many other methods of detection, which I suppose to be
permissible, except for the scope given to the provisions of the Federal
Communications Act". ,
Judge Clark dissenting, believed that the majority took "a long step be-
yond previous interdictions of the use of telephonic communications as legal
evidence" in holding that even one party to the tapped conversation who
might wish to make use of it could not legally do so. He believed that a
party to a telephone conversation considered that he placed it within the
power of the other party to make use of any part of the conversation. He
cited in support of his contention the clause of Section 605 reading: "No
person not being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any inter-
state or foreign communication by wire or radio and use the same or any
information therein contained for his own benefit or for the benefit of an-
other not entitled thereto." This clearly implied, he thought, that a person
entitled to receive the communication might himself use it. He discussed
the practical consequences of the majority ruling. It must follow from that
ruling that the record of the intercepted conversations would be inadmissible,
that the testimony of the agents who might also listen in would be objection-
able. Thus the only competent evidence of the conversations would be the
testimony of the party himself. This would rule out the most trustworthy
evidence, the accurate record by the machine, and compel reliance on the
memory of the party, who might also,_ if formerly associated in crime with
the defendant, find it to his advantage to falsify some part of the conver-
sations. Moreover, the majority ruling would mean that criminals by taking
the precaution of communicating, with each other by telephone would lessen
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the risk that one of their number could effectively betray them to the police.
Lastly, a party to a telephone conversation could not permit his secretary
to overhear and transcribe a conversation in which he might be threatened
or in which blackmail might be attempted, for both would be guilty of a
criminal offense under Section 605.
The Polakoff case had been preceded by a district court decision 62 which
also involved a recording over a telephone extension of a conversation be-
tween an informer and the accused. The court rejected the latter's claim
that reception of the record in evidence was error. under Section 605. It
held that the call was not "intercepted" within the meaning of the Statute,
but was merely recorded at one end of the line by one of the participants,
differing only in method from a transcription of a telephone conversation
made by a participant. The court did not discuss the question of the sig-
nificance of the consent of the one party to the call. The majority opinion
in the Polakoff case cited this case but expressly disagreed with the result.
The Second Circuit Court in the Polakoff case did not cite United States
v. Bruno63 in which it had previously held that admission in evidence of
a conversation between defendant and a conspirator made in the circuit from
which the latter was speaking, even if an error, would not warrant a reversal
inasmuch as a government agent, posing as a buyer of narcotics, was present
when the conspirator used the telephone and his testimony that the conver-
sations took place would have supported the conviction without corrobora-
tion by the recording. The court assumed in that case that the testimony of
the person overhearing the one end of the conversation was admissible, and
since he was not an intercepter nor an eavesdropper, there is no reason to
suppose this to be incorrect. In the Polakoff case, the majority did not dis-
cuss the admissibility of testimony by the agents; it appeared, however, from
the reference in the dissenting opinion, that they listened in on the extension
to both ends of the conversation, so that their testimony as intercepters was
inadmissible either independently of the records or in corroboration of them.
Another variation in methods of securing evidence by telephone was illus-
trated in a series of California cases involving convictions for violations of
the gambling laws. The facts in all were substantially the same. The de-
cision and reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court of California in People
v. Kelley 64 was followed in the others.'6 The Kelley case, though decided
'6 2United States v. Yee Ping Jong, 26 F. Supp. 69 (W. D. Pa. 1939).
163105 F. (2d) 921 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).16422 Cal. (2d) 169, 137 P. (2d) 1 (1943) aff'g. 122 P. (2d) 655 (Cal. App. 2d
Dist. 1942) appeal dismissed 320 U. S. 715, 64 Sup. Ct. 264 (1943), rehearing denied
321 U. S. 802, 64 Sup. Ct. 527 (1944).
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in a state court, was an interpretation of Section 605 of the Federal Com-
munications Act.166 The defendant therein assigned as error the admission
in the lower court of the testimony of police officers to the contents of tele-
phone messages which they heard when they raided defendant's apartment
and answered the telephone. The court, assuming without discussion that
Section 605 governed, held that the accused, never having been a party to
the conversations, was not a "sender", even within the broad interpretation
of the meaning of that term accorded it by United States v. Polakoff. Not
being a sender, he was. not entitled to the protection of the Act under the
decision of the Supreme Court in the Goldstei& case. A vigorous dissenting
opinion, on behalf of two judges, stated that the third clause of Section 605
was applicable--"and no person not being entitled thereto shall receive or
assist in receiving any interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio
and use the same or any information therein contained for his own benefit
or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto." The dissent referred to
the Weiss case as holding all clauses of Section 605 applicable to intrastate
communications, thus eliminating any objection to its application here.16T
In the alternative, the first clause prohibiting interception and divulgence
would effectively bar the admission of the testimony in question, according
to the minority. It interpreted the Goldstein case as holding that one not a
party had no right to object to divulgence of the intercepted conversa-
tions, and it considered defendant a party inasmuch as the messages were
intended for him. The dissenting opinion further expressed the view that
the messages never having completed their intended course were "intercepted"
within the meaning of Section 605.168
"Interception" as used in Section 605 was the subject of further interpre-
tation by the Supreme Court in Goldman v. United States.6 9 The defend-
ants were convicted of conspiracy to violate the Bankruptcy Act. Federal
'
65People'v. Vertlieb, 22 Cal. (2d) 193, 137 P. (2d) 437 (1943) ; People v. Onofrio,
65 Cal. App. (2d) 584, 151 P. (2d) 158 (1944) ; People v. Barnhart, 66 Cal. App. (2d)
714, 153 P. (2d) 2.14 (1944).
166Whether § 605 controls admission of evidence in state courts will be discussed
infra Part IV.
167That this view is mistaken has already been pointed out in discussion of the
Weiss case.
16SIf exclusion of the evidence in the Kelley case seemed desirable under the policy
of § 605, a more forceful dissent might have reasoned from the premise that an un-
lawful interception occurred as stated by the minority and that in allowing testimony
of- the contents of the intercepted messages, the court permitted a "divulgence" within
the meaning of the second clause of § 605. That is, it sanctioned the commission of a
crime in its presence.
169316 U. S. 129, 62 Sup. Ct. 993 (1942), aff'g. United States v. Goldman, 118 F.
(2d) 310 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
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agents obtained knowledge of the scheme on the disclosure of one of the
conspirators. With the assistance of the building superintendent, they ob-
tained access at night to the office of one of the defendants and installed a
listening apparatus to enable them to overhear from the adjoining room.
When this apparatus did not work, the agents working in this adjoining
room, placed against the partition a hearing device called a detectaphone,
which amplified sounds in the defendant's office. By means of this device,
they overheard conferences in furtherance of the scheme and also heard
what the defendant said when speaking over, the telephone in his office. It
was to the reception of the latter portion of the evidence that defendant ob-
jected as a violation of Section 605. The Supreme Court held by a five to three
decision, that the evidence was properly received. It decided that both "wire
communication" and "intercept" indicated that the Act was intended to pro-
tect the message in the course of its transmission and not before or at the
moment it left the proposed sender or after or at the moment it came
into the possession of the intended receiver. Overhearing the words the de-
fendant spoke into the telephone receiver was not within the terms of the
Communications Act to any greater extent than overhearing a conversation
by one sitting in the same room. The Court further ruled that the trespass
of which the agents were guilty in installing the first apparatus had no causal
relation with the listening over the detectaphone and therefore did not affect
the legal consequences. Finally the Court denied the defendant's contention
that since a person talking, as in this case, in his own office did not intend
his voice to project beyond four walls and did not take the risk of an am-
plifying device nearby, the use of the detectaphone was a violation of the
right of privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. The Court could
see no great distinction between wire tapping and listening through a de-
tectaphone. It expressly refused to overrule the Olmistead case, as well as
to distinguish it. 0
Chief Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated their readiness to
overrule the Olinstead case, but since the majority declined to do this, they
based their dissents on the dissenting opinions in that case. Mr. Justice
Murphy dissented in the belief that the use of the detectaphone under the
circumstances of this case was an unreasonable search and seizure. He con-
sidered the Olnstead decision wrong, but thought that even if it should re-
main the law, it did not govern the present case. Wire tapping is a device
usually employed outside the home, but the application of a detectaphone
to the walls of a room "constitutes a direct invasion of the privacy of the
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occupant and a search of his private quarters". The opinion discusses at some
length the need for expanding the range of the Fourth Amendment in har-
mony with the innovation of scientific devices adaptable to invasion of the
privacy of the individual and concludes that its purpose should not be
thwarted by too literal an interpretation.
Aside from the question raised by the Goldman decision under the Fourth
Amendment, it was clearly correct in holding that eavesdropping by federal
agents to one end of a telephone conversation did not constitute an "inter-
ception" within the meaning of Section 605. Whatever other protection
should be afforded by the law against an act of this kind, the policy under-
lying the adoption and interpretation of this statute does not extend so far.
The same is probably true of the facts presented by the Polakaff and Kelley
cases as well. While in those cases government agents secured evidence of
the messages as or before they reached their intended hearers, wire tapping
in its most insidious form, the secret eavesdropping on a conversation of
which both parties are ignorant and against 'which they are helpless to pro-
tect themselves, was not an element. Congress did not intend to cut off all
resort by federal agents to trickery, spying, posing, and eavesdropping in
the detection of crime. These are methods which have long been accepted
as necessary weapons in the law enforcement arsenal. Only where the means
used threatened a serious invasion of privacy, did this become the over-
mastering consideration necessitating prohibitive Jegislation. The methods
used to secure evidence in the Polakoff, Kelley and Goldmzn cases were es-
sentially those (except possibly the amplifying device in the last) which
would not have been questioned in a federal court without the incidental
use of the telephone. In the Polakoff case the transcription of the conver-
sation between the defendant and the informer might have been effected se-
cretly if they had spoken to one another in person; in the Kelley case, the
police, by concealing their identity from the other party to the conversation,
took messages intended for another, but this action was a far cry from the
clandestine tapping of wires; in the Goldman case, the evidence was obtained
by eavesdropping. Betrayal, deceit, and eavesdropping were not grounds
for exclusion of the evidence secured by these methods. The fact that the
telephone was incidentally- involved did not bring them within the scope of
Section 605.
1 The extent to which wire tapping is used by federal officers in the scope
of their duties is revealed by the facts in the cases decided under Section 605.
It is significant that all those cases thus far discussed arose on an objection
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to admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the provisions of that sec-
tion. The same -acts which gave rise to these objections were usually crimes,
however, subject to penalties provided in Section 501 of the A&. Yet the cases
of prosecutions of the officers committing these crimes are noteworthy for their
scarcity. Only one case is reported of a prosecution under Section 605, and
the defendants there were private individuals. 70 They were charged with
conspiracy to violate the wire tapping sections of the Communications Act.
The appeal involved only the principal conspirator, a lawyer, who had in-
duced a telephone operator 'in the office of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission to connect his office telephone by means of "the conference system"
with calls from a Commission employee in Chicago to his superior in New
York. The operator twice connected him with such conversations. It was
contended for the defendant that although the operator intercepted the mes-
sages she could not have divulged them because she niever heard the conver-
sations. The Court held, however, that transmission to a third party with-
out consent of the sender was an interception and divulgence even though
the intercepter had no knowledge of the conversations. The Court apparently
assumed that interception followed by divulgence was necessary for a vio-
lation; at least it did not make the obvious response to the defendant's con-
tention, if interception was sufficient to make out a crime, that it was un-
necessary to rule on the meaning of "divulgence".
Mention' of two other Supreme Court cases has been reserved for the
conclusion of this part of the study relating to federal law, for while they
do not deal with wire tapping, they introduce a revolutionary theory which,
if adhered to, may vitally affect the law of admissibility of evidence in the
federal courts, including the admissibility of evidence secured by wire tap-
ping. The cases referred to are McNabb v. United States"r and its com-
panion case Anderson v. United States.1 72 Both held that failure of arrest-
ing officers to take defendants before a committing magistrate as required
by statute rendered inadmissible the confessions obtained while they were
confined for questioning. The opinions clearly exclude any possibility that
they are based on the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment or
on the consideration that the confessions were involuntary and therefore un-
trustworthy. While they contain no reference to the common law rule ad-
17OUnited States v. Gruber, 39 F. Supp.,291 (S. D. N. Y. 1941) (motion.to quash
indictment and suppress evidence denied) ; 123 F. (2d) 307 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) (appeal
from conviction).
171318 U. S. 332, 63 Sup. Ct. 608 (1943).
172318 U. S. 350, 63 Sup. Ct. 599 (1943).
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mitting relevant evidence regardless of the manner of its obtention, the theory
adopted is that disregard of the procedural requirement of the statute is suf-
ficient to exclude the confessions. In the McNabb case the Court said: "In
the exercise of its supervisory authority over the administration of criminal
justice in the federal courts, see Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338,
,341-42, this Court has, from the very beginning of its history, formulated
rules of evidence to be applied in federal criminal prosecutions. . . . And in
formulating such rules of evidence for federal criminal trials the Court has
been guided by considerations of justice not limited to the strict canons of
evidentiary relevance."' 73 Mr. Justice Reed, dissenting, stated his opposi-
tion to "this new rule of evidence" because it would broaden "the possibilities
of defendants escaping punishment by these more rigorous technical require-,
ments in the administration of justice". Thus the lines were drawn as in
every other phase of the controversy, the proponents of the strict regard for
personal rights against those more concerned for the enforcement ot the
criminal law.
The statute which was violated in the McNabb case was a federal statute,
and in the Anderson case a state statute. The Court therefore declared a
policy directly opposite to the one which guided it a year earlier in the de-
cisions of the Goldstein case and which it must have approved in the express
reaffirmance of the Olmstead case in Goldman v. United States. The Gold-
stein case, it will be remembered, held that evidence secured indirectly
through the use of wire tapping before trial, even though this constituted a
violation of a federal statute, was nevertheless admissible under the common
law rule that the court would ignore the manner of obtention of the evidence.
The Olnstead case held that violation of a Washington wire tapping statute
by federal officers in securing evidence for a criminal case did not render
the evidence inadmissible on trial. The decisions of the Supreme Court had
never deviated from the common law rule except in those cases where the
illegal act was a violation of a Constitutional guaranty or admission pro-
hibited by statute. The doctrine of the McNabb and Anderson cases, there-
fore, represents a distinct departure from the previous rule and a conversion
to the views set forth by Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis in
the dissenting opinions of the Burdeau and Olnstead cases. In the law of
wire tapping, the McNabb and Anderson decisions will, if the court is con-
sistent, have two consequences: (1) The doctrine of the second Nardone
case, which seemed for a time to be shaken by the reasoning in the Goldstein
173318 U. S. 332, 341, 63 Sup. Ct. 608, 613 (1943).
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case, will be reinstated, removing any doubt that evidence secured by the
use or divulgence of wire tapped information before trial is inadmissible in
a federal court; (2) Evidence secured by federal officers in violation of a
state statute prohibiting wire tapping or use of wire tapped information will
be inadmissible in a federal court whether their acts do or do not fall within
the prohibition of Section 605.
